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Abstract 
This paper introduces Bishop’s constructive mathematics, which can be regarded as the con- 
structive core of mathematics and whose theorems can be translated into many formal systems 
of computable analysis. The real numbers are presented using a set of constructive axioms, from 
which are derived some elementary properties of the real line R, including its completeness. 
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1. What is constructive mathematics? 
In this paper we outline some of the main features of modem constructive mathe- 
matics, in the hope that we may convince our colleagues interested in all aspects of 
?omputability in analysis that, by examining the analysis developed by Errett Bishop 
and his followers - an analysis that is, in practice, based on logical, rather than overtly 
algorithmic, considerations - they can find a rich source of material for implementation 
within their models of computation. 
Many mathematicians believe that what distinguishes constructive mathematicians 
from the practitioners of traditional, or classical, mathematics (that which is taught 
in most university courses) is a distrust of such principles as the law of excluded 
middle (LEM) and the axiom of choice. In fact, the original motivation for con- 
structive mathematics, according to pioneers of the subject such as Brouwer [ 1 l] and 
Bishop [2], is a positive one: a desire to interpret existence strictly in terms of com- 
putability, or constructivity, a desire which happens to lead, for good reasons, to that 
distrust. 
We concentrate on Errett Bishop’s approach to constructive mathematics (BISH), 
which originated in 1967 with the publication of the book Foundations of Constructive 
Analysis [2], in which Bishop developed large parts of classical and modem analysis 
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within a strictly constructive framework. His development was based on a primitive, 
unspecified notion of algorithm and on the properties of the natural numbers: 
The primary concern of mathematics is number, and this means the positive inte- 
gers. We feel about number the way Kant felt about space. The positive integers 
and their arithmetic are presupposed by the very nature of our intelligence and, we 
are tempted to believe, by the very nature of intelligence in general. The develop- 
ment of the positive integers from the primitive concept of the unit, the concept 
of adjoining a unit, and the process of mathematical induction carries complete 
conviction. In the words of Kronecker, the positive integers were created by God. 
[2> P. 21 
Although Bishop has been criticised for being too vague in his concept of algorithm, 
by this very vagueness he left open the possibility of interpreting his work within 
a variety of formal systems. Not only is every theorem of BISH also a theorem of 
recursive constructive mathematics - which is, roughly, recursive function theory de- 
veloped with intuitionistic logic - but it is also a theorem of Brouwer’s intuitionistic 
mathematics 1 and, perhaps more significantly, of classical mathematics. This last point 
is worth emphasising: every proof in BISH is a valid proof in classical mathematics. 
Moreover, we believe that Bishop’s proofs of analytic results can be translated, often 
routinely, into algorithms within any of the computational models discussed at this 
Dagstuhl Seminar on Computability and Complexity in Analysis. 
We have already alluded to intuitionistic logic, the logic that is forced upon us when 
we want to work constructively. An examination of constructive mathematical practice 
leads us to the following interpretations of the logical connectives and quantifiers. 
P V Q: we have either a proof of P or a proof of Q. 
PA Q: we have a proof of P and a proof of Q. 
TP: assuming P, we can derive a contradiction (such as 0 = 1). 
P + Q: we can convert 2 any proof of P into a proof of Q. 
3xP(x): there is an algorithm which computes an object x and demonstrates that 
P(x) holds. 
Vx E AP(x): there is an algorithm which, applied to an object x and a proof that 
x E A, demonstrates that P(x) holds. 
Heyting [19] gathered the underlying principles that appeared to follow from these 
interpretations into the axioms for intuitionistic logic. To recover axioms for classical 
logic, one need only add to Heyting’s intuitionistic axioms the law of excluded middle, 
’ For more information on the relation between BISH, recursive constructive mathematics, and intuitionistic 
mathematics, see [S, IO], or [6]. 
* This interpretation of implication, while more natural than the classical one of material implication, in 
which (P + Q) is equivalent to (4’ V Q), has not completely satisfied all researchers using constructive logic. 
Shortly before he died, Bishop communicated to the author his dissatisfaction with the standard constructive 
interpretation of implication. Unfortunately, he left nothing more than very rudimentary sketches of his ideas 
for its improvement. 
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P V lP, whose constructive inadmissibility follows immediately from the interpretation 
of disjunction given earlier (a matter that we shall clarify shortly). 
Now, our experience shows that when we do constructive mathematics, we are actu- 
ally doing mathematics with intuitionistic logic. The desire for algorithmic interpretabil- 
ity forces us to use intuitionistic logic, and that restriction of our logic seems to re- 
sult, inevitably, in arguments that are entirely algorithmic in character. Maybe this is 
Bishop’s “secret still on the point of being blabbed” ([2], epigraph): algorithmic math- 
ematics appears to be equivalent o mathematics that uses only intuitionistic logic. If 
that is the case - and all the evidence of our experience suggests that it is - then we can 
carry out our mathematics using intuitionistic logic on any reasonably defined mathe- 
matical objects, not just some class of “constructive objects”. This view of constructive 
mathematics is essentially that of Richman [24,25]; it was also prefigured in [4]. 
In order to develop mathematics, and not just logic, constructively, we need objects 
upon which we can operate. These objects are the natural numbers, already discussed 
above, together with sets and functions. 
According to Bishop, 
A set is not an entity which has an ideal existence: a set exists only when it 
has been defined. To define a set we prescribe, at least implicitly, what we (the 
constructing intelligence) must do in order to construct an element of the set, and 
what we must do to show that two elements of the set are equal. [2, p. 21 
Note that it is not required that the property characterising a set be decidable 
(cf. [l&5]). This is consonant with recursive mathematics, in which not every set 
is recursive. Note also that equality is defined for each particular set, and must sat- 
isfy the usual rules of reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity. So in order to combine 
sets using the operations of union and intersection, we need those sets to be given as 
subsets of some larger set inducing the equality on each of the subsets. 
In general, Bishop does not deal with intensional equality (identity) of objects. For 
example, he defines a real number as a sequence (x~) of rational numbers 
regular, in the sense that 
that is 
1 1 
Ixm -x,1<- + - 
m n 
for all m, n 2 1; he then defines two real numbers (x, ), ( yn ) to be equal if 
for all n > 1. So he works directly with Cauchy sequences, rather than, as would the 
classical mathematician, with equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences (cf. the standard 
practice of identifying the fractions 4 and $ ). 
Having dealt with sets, Bishop turns to functions: 
in order to define a function from a set A to a set B, we prescribe a finite routine 
which leads from an element of A to an element of B, and show that equal 
elements of A give rise to equal elements of B. [2, p. 21 
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If we omit the requirement that equality be preserved, then we relax the notion of 
function to that of operation. This notion is rather contentious, and we will avoid 
further mention of it wherever possible. It is, however, important in Martin-Lof’s 
type-theoretic formalisation of constructive mathematics, which has had a significant 
impact on the work of computer scientists interested in extracting programs from proofs 
[21,12,17]. 
Building on the positive integers, weaving a web of ever more sets and more 
functions, we get the basic structures of mathematics: the rational number system, 
the real number system, the euclidean spaces, the complex number system, the 
algebraic number fields, Hilbert space, the classical groups, and so forth. Within 
the framework of these structures most mathematics is done. Everything attaches 
itself to number, and every mathematical statement ultimately expresses the fact 
that if we perform certain computations within the set of positive integers, we 
shall get certain results. [2, pp. 2-31. 
An interesting formal system for Bishop’s mathematics, using number, set, and func- 
tion as primitives, was given by Myhill [23]. The same author has also developed 
intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory as a foundation for constructive mathemat- 
ics [22]. Other foundational systems for BISH are found in [15, 14,21,7]. Excellent 
sources for constructive foundational matters are [ 1,261. 
Of course, there are many classical results that we cannot hope to prove construc- 
tively; in other words, results that are essentially nonalgorithmic. To illustrate this point, 
consider the following simple statement, dubbed the limited principle of omniscience 
(LPO) by Bishop: 
VaE{O,l}N (a=OVa#O), 
where a = (ao, al, a2,. . .), N = (0, 1,2,. . .} is the set of natural numbers, 
a=0 * Vn (a,=O), 
a#0 H 3n (an=l). 
In words, LPO states that for each binary sequence (a,), either a,, = 0 for all n or else 
there exists n such that a,, = 1. If this principle could be proved constructively, then, 
applying it to the binary sequence defined by 
0 if 2k is a sum of two primes for 2<k<n + 1, 
a, = 
1 otherwise, 
we would be able either to prove the Goldbach Conjecture - every even integer >2 
is a sum of two primes - or else to compute an even integer >2 that is not a sum 
of two primes. By applying LPO to other well-chosen binary sequences, we would be 
able to solve, by a decision procedure, a whole host of open problems, including the 
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Riemann Hypothesis. “Of course, such a method . . . does not exist, and nobody expects 
that one will ever be found” [2, p. 51. We therefore conclude that LPO should not 
be admitted as a working principle of constructive mathematics, and that any proposi- 
tion that constructively implies LPO should be regarded as essentially nonconstructive. 
In particular, this reinforces the view that the law of excluded middle, of which LPO 
is a trivial consequence, is nonconstructive. 
There are stronger reasons for rejecting LPO in the constructive setting. First, there 
are so-called Kripke models of arithmetic which show that LPO cannot be derived 
with intuitionistic logic [26, Ch. 21. Secondly, the recursive interpretation of LPO is 
provably false within recursive function theory, even with classical logic (see [ 10, Ch. 
31); so if we want BISH to remain consistent with a recursive interpretation, we must 
not allow LPO to be used therein. 
Our rejection of LPO has some significant consequences even at the level of the real 
number line R. For example, we cannot expect to prove constructively that 
‘V’XER (x=Ovx#O), 
where x # 0 means IX]> 0. (Here we are assuming some elementary constructive prop- 
erties of R.) For if we could prove this statement, then, given any binary sequence 
(a,) and applying it to the real number whose binary expansion is 0 . ala2a3 . . . , we 
could prove LPO. 
Among other classical propositions that imply LPO are 
l the law of trichotomy: Vx E R (x < 0 V x = 0 V x > 0); 
l the least-upper-bound principle: Each nonempty subset of R that is bounded above 
has a least upper bound; 
l every real number is either rational or irrational. (Consider a decreasing binary se- 
quence (a,) and the real number C,“=, a&! .) 
Now, in constructive mathematics we are more interested in positive results, not these 
negative ones that show what cannot be done. Fortunately, we have the following 
constructive principles that enable us to circumvent the unavailability of the law of 
trichotomy and the least-upper-bound principle. 
l If a < b, then for each x E R either x >a or x < b. (This principle is often used to 
split a proof into cases.) 
l The constructive least-upper-bound principle: If S is a nonempty subset of R that is 
bounded above, and if for all s/I with @</I, 
VxES(x<@V3xES (x>a), 
then the supremum of S exists. 
Another classically trivial consequence of LEM that is not acceptable in BISH is the 
lesser limited principle of omniscience (LLPO): 
For each binary sequence (a,) with at most one term equal to 1, either a2,, = 0 
for all n or else azn+l = 0 for all n. 
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Among the classical propositions that entail LLPO and are therefore regarded as es- 
sentially nonconstructive are 
l YXER (x>OvxdO). 
l If x,yER and xy=O, then x=0 or y=O. 
a The Intermediate Value Theorem: If f : [0, l] -+ R is a continuous function with 
f (0) <O < f (l), then there exists x E (0,l) such that f(x) = 0. 
For more on LPO, LLPO, and related matters, we refer the reader to Ch. 1 of [lo]. 
Again, there are constructive substitutes for these unusable classical results. For 
example, there are several constructive versions of the Intermediate Value Theorem, 
each of which can be successfully applied to most of the functions that arise in practice 
in analysis; see [3, pp. 40-41, 63; 11, pp. 54-581. Moreover, the range and depth of 
the mathematics developed by Bishop in [2] is surely sufficient to disprove Hilbert’s 
contention that 
Taking the principle of excluded middle from the mathematician would be the 
same, say, as proscribing the telescope to the astronomer or to the boxer the use 
of his fists. [20] 
To end this introductory section, let us look at the role of various axioms of choice 
in constructive mathematics. We first observe that the full axiom of choice entails LEM 
[16], a fact that appears to conflict with Bishop’s remark [2, p. 93 that 
the axiom of choice.. .is not a real source of nonconstructivity in classical mathe- 
matics. A choice function exists in constructive mathematics, because a choice is 
implied by the very meaning of existence. 
Now, it is true that if to each element x of a set A there corresponds an element y 
of set B such that the property P(x, y) holds, then it is implied by the meaning of 
“existence” in constructive mathematics that there is a finite routine for computing an 
appropriate y E B from a given x E A; but this computation may depend not only on 
the value a but also on the information that shows that a belongs to the set A. The 
computation of the value at a of a function f from A to B would depend only on a, 
and not on the proof that a belongs to A; in other words, a function is extensional. 
So Bishop’s remark is correct if he admits “functions” whose value depends on both 
a and a proof that a E A, but is not correct if, as most constructive practitioners do, 
one only admits extensional functions. 
Note that the axiom of choice will hold constructively if the set A is one for which 
no computation is necessary to demonstrate that an element belongs to it; Bishop calls 
such sets basic sets. Most constructivists would regard the set N+ of positive integers 
as a basic set, a belief that is reflected in the acceptance of the principle of countable 
choice: 
If to each positive integer n there corresponds an element y of a set A such that 
P(n, y), then there is a function f : N+ + A such that P(n, f (n)) for each n E Nf. 
D.S. Bridges1 Theoretical Computer Science 219 (1999) 95-109 101 
In fact, many constructive proofs use the stronger principle of dependent 
choice: 
If a E A, and to each x E A there corresponds y E A such that P(x, y), then there 
exists a function f : N+ + A such that f (1) = Q and P( f (n), f (n + 1)) for each 
nEN*. 
2. Constructive axioms for the real line 
We now present a set of axioms for the constructive theory of the real line R, 
analogous to those given for the classical theory in [ 131. Our axioms are intended to 
capture the idea that a real number is something that can be arbitrarily closely ap- 
proximated by rational numbers. (In Bishop’s formal construction, referred to above, 
that approximation is done by means of regular Cauchy sequences of rational 
numbers. ) 
It may, at first sight, seem strange to seek a constructive axiomatic presentation of 
the real line, but there are at least two reasons for wanting to do so. First, there is 
the possible advantage in teaching a course in constructive mathematics. Experience 
has convinced us that Bishop’s formal constructive development of the real number 
system, starting with the notion of a regular (Cauchy) sequence of rational numbers, 
takes more time and effort than one might wish, and is sufficiently tricky for many 
students as to distract them from the main business of constructive analysis. We believe 
that it is possible to give a convincing motivation for the axioms presented below, by 
heuristic arguments based on the informal idea that a real number is something for 
which we can find (with emphasis on the word “find”) arbitrarily close rational approxi- 
mations. 
Our second reason for seeking constructive axioms for the real line is the math- 
ematician’s natural curiosity about which properties suffice either to characterise that 
object or at least to enable one to develop real analysis constructively. 
Our starting point is to assume the existence of a set R with 
l a binary relation >(greater than) 
l a corresponding inequality relation # defined by 
x# y if and only if (x>y or y>x) 
l binary operations (x, y) H x + y (addition) and (x, y) H xy (multiplication) 
l distinguished elements 0 (zero) and 1 (one) with 0 # 1 
l a unary operation x H -x 
l a unary operation x H x-’ on the set of elements x # 0. 
The elements of R are called real numbers. We say that a real number x is positive if 
x >O, and negative if -x > 0. We define the relation >(greuter than or equal to) by 
x>y if and only if Vz (y>z+x>z), 
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and we define the relations < and d in the usual way, calling x nonnegative if x 2 0. 
Two real numbers x, y are equal if x > y and y ax, in which case we write x = y. Note 
that this notion of equality satisfies the usual properties of an equivalence relation. 
We identify the sets N of natural numbers, Nf of positive integers, Z of integers, 
and Q of rational numbers with the usual subsets of R: for example, we identify Nf 
with {nl: HEN+}. 
These relations3 and operations satisfy three groups of axioms. 
Rl. R is a Heyting field: For all x, y,z E R, 
x+y=y+x, 
(x+y)+z=x+(y+z), 
0+x=x, 
x+(-x)=0, 
xy = yx, 
(xv >z =X(YZ), 
1x=x, 
xx -‘=l if x#O, 
x(y+z)=xy+xz. 
We also denote x-’ by i or l/x. 
It is natural to ask whether, for the existence of x-l, it suffices to have -(x = 0). 
The answer is provided by a well-known example which shows that the statement 
Vxjc~R (~(x=0)+3y~R (xy=l)) 
is equivalent to Markov’s Principle (MP): 
VaE{O,l}N (7(a=O)*a#O); 
that is, if (a,) is a binary sequence such that -Vn (a, = 0), then there exists n such that 
a,, = 1 (see [lo, Ch. 1, Problem 81). Since Markov’s Principle is a form of unbounded 
search, it is not accepted by the majority of constructive mathematicians (although it 
is clearly true in classical mathematics). 
The next group of axioms describes several properties of the ordering >. 
R2. Basic properties of >: 
(1) l(x>y and y>x). 
(2) (x>y)*Vz (x>zVz>y). 
(3) ‘(x#Y)Jx=Y* 
(4) (x>y)=+Vz (x+z>y+z). 
(5) (x>OA y>O)*xy>O. 
3 We assume that all relations and operations are extensional: for example, to say that the relation > is 
extensional means that if x > y, x=x’, and y = y’, then X’ > y’. 
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The second of these axioms is a substitute for the law of trichotomy, and can be 
justified heuristically (see [9]). In connection with axiom R2(3), note that the statement 
is equivalent to Markov’s Principle [lo, Ch. 1, Problem 81. 
Our last two axioms describe special properties of > and >, . For the second of these 
we need to know that the notions bounded above, bounded below, and bounded are 
defined as in classical mathematics; and that, for example, if S is a nonempty subset 
of R that is bounded above, then its Ieast upper bound, if it exists, is the unique real 
number b such that 
a b is an upper bound of S, and 
l for each b’ <b there exists s E S such that s > b’. 
(Note that nonempty means what the intuitionists call “inhabited”; that is, we can 
construct an element of the set in question.) 
R3. Special properties of >: 
(1) Axiom of Archimedes: For each x E R there exists n E Z such that x <n. 
(2) The least-upper-bound principle: Let S be a nonempty subset of R that is bounded 
above relative to the relation 2, such that for all real numbers ~1, /? with CI <B, 
either B is an upper bound of S or else there exists s E S with s > X; then S has a 
least upper bound. 
The first of these two axioms would seem to require no justification. The second 
is a little harder to motivate, but can be justified heuristically using an approximate 
interval halving argument [9]. 
Omitting many of the simpler proofs, we now derive some elementary constructive 
properties of the real line that involve the orderings > and 2. 
1. 1(X)X) 
2. x3x 
3. (x>yAy>z)=+x>z 
Since x > y, either x > z or z > y. The latter is ruled out by axiom R2( 1). 
4. 7(x>yAy>x) 
If X> y and y>x, then y>y, by definition of 2. This is absurd. 
5. (x>y2z)=sx>z 
Either x>z or z > y>z. The latter is ruled out by 4. 
6. (xay>z)+x>z 
Use the definition of >,. 
7. -(x>y)WyY3x 
If 1(x > y) and x >z, then, by R2(2), y>z. Hence y3x. 
For the converse, use 4 above. 
8. +>y)*--(y>x) 
(Note that the proposition 1(x 2 y) + y >x entails Markov’s Principle.) 
9. (x>y>z)*x3z 
10. (x>yAy>x)=-+x=y 
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If x>y, then x>y>x, which contradicts 4. Hence l(x>y). Similarly, -(y>x), 
so 1(x # y) and therefore, by axiom R2(3), x = y. 
11. 1(x>yAx=y) 
12. x~o+(x=o~v&>o (X<&)) 
If x = 0 and E > 0, then either E >x or x > 0, and the latter is ruled out by the last 
result. 
Conversely, suppose that x <E for all E >O. If x >O, then x<x, a contradiction; so 
0 3x. Thus x > 0 and 0 3x, and therefore x = 0. 
13. x+y>o~(x>ovy>o) 
If x + y > 0, then either x + y >x or else x> 0. In the former case, 
y=(x+y)-x>x-x=0, 
by m(4). 
14. x>o* -x<o 
-x=0+(-x)<x+(-x)=0. 
15. (x>yAz<O)+yz>xz 
Since -z>O, we have 
-xz=x(-z)>y(-z)= -yz, 
SO 
-xz+yz+xz>-yz+yz+xz 
and therefore yz >xz. 
16. x#O+x2>0 
17. l>O 
For, 1’ = 1 # 0. 
18. x2>0 
Suppose x2 < 0. Then 1(x # 0), by 16; so x = 0 and therefore x2 = 0, a contradiction. 
Hence 1(x2 ~0) and therefore x2 20. 
19. o<x<l*xx22 
20. -1<x<1~1(x2>xAx2>-x) 
Suppose that - 1 <x < 1 and that (x2 >x Ax2 > -x). If x> 0, then 
which contradicts our second assumption. Hence 7(x >O) and therefore x GO. 
A similar argument shows that x 80; whence x = 0. But in that case we have 
-x =x2 = x, again a contradiction. 
21. x2>O+x#O 
Either x > 0 or x2 >x. In the latter case, either x2 > -x or -x >x. Suppose --x >x. 
Then 
x-x>x+x=2x, 
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so 0 > x. Thus we may assume that 2 > x and x2 > -x. Then either x > 0 or 1 > x. 
In the latter case, if x > - 1, then we contradict 20; so 0 > - 1 ax and therefore 
o>x. 
22. x>o*x-‘a0 
If O>x-‘, then 1 =x-‘x<x-‘0 = 0, a contradiction. 
23. Let m,m’ be integers, and n,n’ positive integers. Then mfn >m’/n’ if and only if 
mnt > m’n. 
This is an exercise in algebra, starting from the fact that 1 > 0. 
24. If nEN+, then n-‘>O. 
25. If x> 0 and ~30, then there exists n E Z such that nx > y. 
Using axiom R3( 1 ), choose n E Z such that n >n-’ y. Then nx > (x-’ y)x = y 2 0, 
so n>O. 
26. x>O+x-‘>O 
Using axiom R3( l), choose n E Z such that n >x. Then n > 0 and so, by axiom 
R2(5), nx>O. Suppose that x-l <n-l; then by R2(5), 
n = (nx)x-’ < (nx)n-’ =x, 
a contradiction. Hence x-l an-’ >O, and therefore x-l >O. 
27. xy>O+(x#OAy#O) 
Since 
we see that x + y # 0. Without loss of generality, take x + y > 0. Then either x > 0 
or y >O. Taking, for example, the first case, since X-’ > 0 we have 
y=x-‘(xy)>x_‘o=o. 
28. Zf x >O, then there exists n E N+ such that x <n <x + 2. 
Choose m E N+ such that x < m. Either x + 1 < m or m <x + 2. In the latter case, we 
are finished. So we may assume that x + 1~ m and therefore x < m - 1. Repeatedly 
using this procedure, we either reach the desired conclusion or we show that x < 1. 
In the latter case, either x + 1 < 1 and therefore x < 0, which is absurd; or, as must 
be the case, 1 <x + 2. 
29. If a < b, then there exists r E Q such that a <r < b. 
First assume that a> 0. Using 25, choose n > 0 such that n(b - a) >2 and there- 
fore na < na + 2 <nb. By the preceding result, there exists m E Nf such that 
na<m<na+2<nb. Then a<m/n<b, so we can take r=m/n. 
In the general case, choose n E Z such that -a <n. Then b + n >a + n >O; so, by 
the first part of the proof, there exists a rational number r’ with a + n < r’ < b + n. 
Then r = r’ - n is rational and a < r <b. 
There is an obvious question relating to our system of axioms for R: is it categorical? 
In other words, are any two models of these axioms isomorphic? The answer is perhaps 
at first sight surprising: there are nonisomorphic models of the axioms. For example, 
the Dedekind reals satisfy all our axioms and a stronger form of the least-upper-bound 
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principle, and so provide a model that is not isomorphic to the one obtained by Bishop’s 
construction of R using regular sequences of rational numbers (see [26, pp. 270-2771). 
3. The completeness of R 
We now deal with some consequences of the least-upper-bound principle that will 
lead us to a proof of the Cauchy-sequence completeness of R. 
A set S is said to be 
l finitely enumerable if there exist a natural number n and a mapping of { 1,. . . , n} 
onto S; 
l jinite if there exist a natural number n and a oneeone mapping of { 1,. . . , n} onto S. 
In the first case we also say that S has at most n elements, and in the second that S 
has (exactly) n elements. 
The statement 
Every finitely enumerable subset of R is finite 
entails LPO: given a binary sequence (a,), consider the finitely enumerable set 
Lemma 1. Zf S is a jinitely enumerable subset of R, then sups and inf S exist. 
Proof. Let S = {xi , . . . ,x,}. Given real numbers cc,/I with a </I, we apply axiom R2(2) 
n times to prove that either xk <p for each k or else there exists j such that Xj > c(. 
Axiom R3(2) now shows that sups exists. The proof for inf S is similar. 0 
Let S be a subset of R. By an E-approximation to S we mean a subset F of S such 
that for each x E S there exists y E F with Ix-y] <E. We say that S is totally bounded 
if for each E >O there exists a finite s-approximation to S. It is an exercise to show 
that a set is totally bounded if (and clearly only if) for each a>0 it contains a finitely 
enumerable s-approximation. 
Proposition 1. Zf S is a totally bounded subset of R, then sups and inf S exist. 
Proof. Let CL, /I be real numbers with c( </I, and write E = ;@--a). There exists a finite 
s-approximation {xi , . . . ,x,} to S. By the preceding lemma, 
B=sup{xi,...,x,} 
exists. Either (T > a or o < c( + a. In the first case there exists j such that xj > CI. In the 
second, consider any x E S. Choosing j such that Ix - xj 1 <E, we have 
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So in this case, /I is an upper bound for S. It follows from axiom R3(2) that sups 
exists. Similarly, inf S exists. 0 
A sequence (xn) of real numbers is said to be 
l a Cauchy sequence if for each E >O there exists N such that IX, - x,1 <E for all 
m,naN; 
l convergent if there exists a real number 1, called the limit of (x,), such that for each 
E > 0 there exists N such that Ixn - 11~ E for all n > N. 
We aim to prove the converse of the easily established result that a convergent sequence 
in R is a Cauchy sequence. 
Lemma 2. if (x,) is a Cauchy sequence in R, then {x”: n > 1) is totally bounded. 
Proof. Given E > 0, choose N such that Ix, -x, I < E for all m, n > N. Then {xi,. . . ,xN} 
is an s-approximation to {x,: n > 1). q 
Lemma 3. If a Cauchy sequence (x,) in R has a convergent subsequence (x,), then 
limn+oo x,, exists and equals limk,, xnk. 
Proof. Let I = limk,, xnt. Given E > 0, choose K such that II- x,, I <E for all k 2K. 
NOW choose N >K such that Ix, -x,1 <E for all m, n >N. If k 3N, then as nN >N, we 
have 
II-xkI<Iz-x,,I+Ix,, -X4<&+&=2&. 0 
Theorem. R is complete: that is, every Cauchy sequence in R converges. 
Proof. Let (x,) be a Cauchy sequence in R. Then for each n, (xk)kan is a Cauchy 
sequence, so by Lemma 2 and Proposition 1, 
s, =sup{xk: kan} 
exists. Given E > 0, choose N, such that lx,,, -x,, I < E for all m, n 2 N,. For such m and n, 
suppose that s, - s, > E and choose j > m such that 
Xj >S, - (s, - s, - E); 
then 
X~-XX,>S”+E-SS,=E, 
which is absurd as IXj - x,,l <E. Hence Is, - s,, GE for all m, n > N,, and so (s,) is a 
Cauchy sequence. Thus, by Lemma 2 and Proposition 1, 
t = inf s, 
?I>1 
exists. 
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We show that lim,,, xn = t. To this end, choose N such that SN <t + 8. Then as 
for each n>N we have t - &<s,<t + E, so there exists van with t - E<X,<t + E. 
A simple inductive construction now provides a subsequence (x,)gl of (x,) such that 
t - k-’ <x,,~ < t + k-’ for each k. Then limk+, x,, = t. It follows from Lemma 3 that 
(xn) converges to t. 0 
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